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Effects of privatisation of low-cost 
public rental housing in Matero, 
Lusaka  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Property rights are widely imagined to have considerable positive effects on 
urban poverty. However, evidence is scarce, particularly regarding non-
economic aspects of property rights. Evidence is also lacking from the Southern 
African context. This paper examines effects of property rights in Zambia 
through a case-study of the privatisation of low-cost public rental housing for 
poor people in Matero neighbourhood of Lusaka city. Data from a household 
survey (n=623) is used. Ordinary Least Squares and logistic regressions are 
employed. Altogether, eleven hypotheses are tested. Results show that titling 
contributes to an increase in property values, household per capita income and 
wealth, in terms of household durables, and political awareness. There is no 
effect of titling on employment status of heads of households, employment status 
of female heads of household, access to credit, home-based investments, 
membership in voluntary associations, neighbourhood attachment and 
frequency of volunteerism. The study demonstrates that effects of titling extend 
beyond economic effects, a sphere which scholars need to explore further. Since 
titling had no effect by important economic measures, it is likely that poverty in 
Matero is driven so strongly by macroeconomic factors such as high 
unemployment in Zambia such that property rights make little difference to 
poverty. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Titling has been advanced as an important solution to urban poverty (Durand-
Lasserve and Selod, 2009: 110-111). Titling may be defined as the process of 
integrating informal tenure into a system recognized by public authorities 
through the delivery of real property rights authenticated and guaranteed by the 
state through freehold and leasehold title deeds (Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 
2009: 105). From the 1970s, titling programmes have been promoted alongside 
homeownership schemes aimed at increasing tenure security and reducing 
poverty across the developing world (De Soto, 2000; Buckley and Kalarickal, 
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2006; Payne et al., 2009: 444). Few empirical studies have been carried out in 
this field (Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2009: 115). Empirical knowledge on the 
effects of titling in Southern Africa is even scarcer despite the existence of 
titling programmes. Furthermore, the few empirical studies that have been done 
across the developing world are overwhelmingly focused on economic effects 
such as improvements in property values (Lanjouw and Levy, 2002), labour 
supply and household income (Field, 2005; 2007; Field and Torero, 2006), 
access to credit (Field and Torero, 2006; Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2009: 
109; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010: 710), and home-based investments. 
Scholars have paid less attention to non-economic effects even though ‘titling 
theory’ predicts that property rights have both human and social capital effects 
(Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2004; 2010; Vogl, 2007; Pecha and Ruprah, 2010; 
Gandelman, 2010) which include children’s education, health and political 
awareness, membership in voluntary associations, neighbourhood attachment, 
civic participation, and volunteerism. Social aspects of development are equally 
important and therefore deserve as much attention as economic aspects. 
 
This paper examines the economic and non-economic effects of property rights 
relative to administrative recognition of occupancy in Lusaka city, Zambia. 
Administrative recognition of occupancy is a process of delivery of temporary 
rights mainly through licenses in which building is conditional on standards set 
by authorities (Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2009: 10). The paper evaluates the 
effects of the sale of low-cost public rental housing to sitting tenants in Matero 
under Zambia’s privatisation policy (pursued by the country since 1991) using 
residents of George Compound (a former informal settlement that was 
upgraded) who possess occupancy licenses as a comparison group. 
  
Studies on urban housing tenure in Zambia have been concerned with the 
evaluation of the World Bank-funded squatter upgrading and site and service 
project which took place between 1974 to 1983 (see Rakodi and Schlyter, 1981; 
Hansen, 1982; Chisanga, 1986; Sanyal, 1987; Rakodi, 1988; Moser et al., 
1997), and the privatisation of publicly-owned housing which began in 1996 
(see Palmer, 2000; Schlyter, 2002; 2004; Basila, 2005; Butcher and Oldfield, 
2009; Mususa, 2010). A comprehensive evaluation of the 1996 Zambia Housing 
Policy is offered by Makasa (2010) but it does not discuss effects of titling, nor 
does it comprehensively evaluate upgrading projects. The study most focused 
on the effects of property rights is a qualitative study offered by Basila (2005) 
on Mufulira, Copperbelt in which she found slight improvement in economic 
status. She concluded however that housing did not lead to meaningful 
economic empowerment and did not provide a sustainable solution to economic 
insecurity. Mususa (2010) offers an ethnographic account of post-privatisation 
experiences of housing in Luanshya, Copperbelt and shows that the houses and 
yards that people gained were used for a wide array of informal economic 
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activities which allowed families to just “get by”. Nevertheless, studies of a 
quantitative nature are few and far between. This paper fills these gaps in the 
literature. Altogether, eleven hypotheses are tested. 
 
 
2. Context 
 
2.1 Matero 
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of Events in Matero 
 
 
Built in 1959, Matero developed as a state rental project for public service 
workers. It was developed by the British Colonial Administration as a result of 
the rise in demand for housing among African workers (Mulenga, 2003: 6; 
Schlyter, 2004: 7). From 1948 through to 1959, 5,097 houses were constructed 
and occupied by municipal workers (Mulenga, 2003: 7). At independence in 
1964, the government of Zambia took over and placed the houses under, what 
was then, the Lusaka Urban District Council. Later in 1996, sitting tenants 
living in public housing in Matero were offered to buy the houses and land 
under 99 year leasehold. At the time of privatisation, Matero was a poor old 
working class area where workers paid rent to the council. Many of the houses 
were dilapidated, had no electricity and had only an external water source and 
pit latrine. According to the Ministry of Local Government and Housing’s 
Circular number 2 entitled “Revised Procedures for Sale of Council Houses”, 
houses were sold at a 100 percent discount because they were old (built during 
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colonial times) and purchased by the government before 1959. Sitting tenants 
only had to pay a transfer fee of K10, 500 (US $8) and a surveying fee of K60, 
000 (US $50). Those that paid the fees and the cost of the house were to receive 
their title deed within 30 days (Schlyter, 2004:6). 
 
 
2.2. George 
 
 
Figure 2: Timeline of Events in George 
 
 
In contrast, George developed as an informal settlement. It was to be 
demolished immediately following independence. For political reasons, the state 
decided to upgrade it. The state upgraded the settlement through the provision 
of services between 1978 and 1981. In 1981, residents of George received the 
administrative recognition of occupancy having been issued occupancy licenses. 
At the time Matero residents were offered houses, George residents were not 
offered the public land on which their houses were built. Occupancy titles gave 
residents of George tenure security and access to services with little control over 
the use of property. Following titling, residents in Matero are allowed to sell 
their land while those in George are not allowed to do so because the land 
belongs to the council (Lusaka City Council, 2010). George residents are not 
allowed to rent out their houses or conduct business on their premises. 
However, due to weak enforcement of laws, transactions do take place in 
George despite these restrictions. In sum, the evolution of housing provision in 
Matero and George can be used to understand the consequences of the provision 
of property rights through titling. 
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2.3. Data 
 
Data on the relationships I aimed to test and in the communities I was 
investigating were not readily available. To obtain the data, I conducted a 
household survey from July to August of 2011, fifteen years after the 
privatisation of houses in Matero. I decided to draw a sample that was as close 
as possible to 10 percent of the number of households that bought houses. There 
were 5,097 households altogether (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 
1996a). This would have meant drawing a sample size of 500 in Matero. Due to 
financial limitations, a sample of 350 households was chosen. I drew this 
sample using interval sampling with intervals of 10 houses using a Google Earth 
map as a sampling frame. For George, the initial idea was to draw a matched 
sample using the respondents’ database from the Zambian census of population 
as a sampling frame. The database is not publicly available and can only be 
requested from the Central Statistics Office. I was however not given 
permission to access this database. I proceeded with drawing an unmatched 
sample of 350 households from George as the best alternative. This meant that 
the robustness of the analysis would be weakened but would still be useful in 
giving an indicative understanding of the effects of titling. I also used interval 
sampling with Google Earth map as a sampling frame. 
 
My method of data collection was a structured questionnaire administered by 7 
enumerators. I conducted training of enumerators over the course of a week. A 
pilot study was conducted with each enumerator conducting one interview 
before the end of the training. Then the questionnaire was reviewed according 
to the comments made. We interviewed heads of households or their competent 
proxies. In Matero, we interviewed households in which the head was a direct 
beneficiary, and who held a title deed or deed of sale. In George, we 
interviewed holders of occupancy licenses, out of approximately 25,000 
households. 
 
The realised sample size came to 623 households (89 percent response rate). I 
obtained a total of 312 completed interviews in Matero and 311 in George. 
However, only 498 observations were feasible for analysis because some of the 
observations indicated that they moved into the houses after 1997 despite 
having bought the houses from the council. It is likely that these are individuals 
who bought the houses after some sitting tenants failed to raise the required 
amounts much later after they were offered or obtained the houses through 
corrupt means. Data were analysed using Stata version 11. The variables used in 
this paper are summarised in table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Response 
Categories 
Description 
Dependent Variables 
Property value Group average What is the market value of the dwelling (in Zambian 
Kwacha)?  
Credit access Binary Have you used this house in any way (e.g. as collateral) 
to obtain loans or credit? 1 = yes and 0 = no 
Employment status Binary Employment status of head of household, 1 = 
employed and 0 = not employed 
Employed female Binary Employment status of female head of household, 1 = 
employed and 0 = not employed 
Home-based 
investments 
Binary Has the house been used for any income generating 
activities? 1 = yes and 0 = no 
Logged Per capita 
income 
Group average What is the total monthly income for this household? 
Logged household 
consumer durables 
Group average Does anyone in the household own the asset listed 
below in working/running condition? Respondents get 
a score of 1 for each  
Memberships in 
voluntary 
associations 
Group average Are you a member of (association/organisation)?  
Respondents get a score of 1 for each 
Political Awareness Composite, 
ordinal 
Here is a list of famous people, indicate what area of 
life they are associated with. Do you watch news on 
television? 1= yes and 0 = no. (Qn 7). Do you read 
newspapers? 1 = yes and 0 = no 
Volunteerism Ordinal How often do you do voluntary work? 0 = never, 1 = 
not often, 2 = often, 3 = very often 
Neighbourhood 
attachment 
Group average Answer if the following statements apply to you. 
(Respondents get a score of 1 for each that apply and 0 
for each that does not apply  
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions (continued) 
Variable Response 
Categories 
Description 
Independent and control Variables 
Leasehold title Binary Tenure type, 1 = leasehold title, Matero residents and 
0 = occupancy license, George residents 
Age Group average Age of household head 
Gender Binary Gender of household head. 1 = male and 0 = female 
Education Group average Number of years of education completed by head of 
household 
Father’s education Group average Number of years of education of father of head of 
household 
Mother’s education Group average Number of years of education of mother of head of 
household 
Household size Group average Number of household members residing in the 
dwelling 
Rooms Group average Number of rooms in the dwelling 
Duration Group average How long respondent has lived in the house if year 
occupied house is before 1997 
 
 
3. Method 
 
I use both OLS and logistic regression analysis to estimate the effects. The 
equation to make the estimates is as follows: 
 
 
 
where  is any of the outcomes under investigation (namely property value, 
credit access, employment status, employment status of female household head, 
home-based investments, income per capita, consumer durables, membership in 
voluntary associations, political awareness, frequency of volunteering and 
neighbourhood attachment) for observation ;  is the estimate which provides 
an indication of the effect of the leasehold title variable (leasehold title being a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for leasehold title and 0 for occupancy title); X is 
any of the covariates controlled for, mainly, but not limited to, background 
characteristics (age, gender, number of years of education, father’s number of 
years of education, mother’s number of years of education and marital status); 
and  is the error term.  
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Regression models follow a similar procedure. Models are first run between the 
respective outcome variable and the dummy for leasehold title. The second 
model regresses the respective outcome variable against demographic 
characteristics. The third model adds variables that are considered to be 
determinants of the outcome according to the respective theory. Essentially, the 
combination of models is aimed at testing whether leasehold title remains a 
significant predictor when other observable factors are controlled for. Cross-
sectional survey data is susceptible to heterogeneity, which should be addressed 
in order to satisfy the OLS model assumption of homoscedasticity. In order to 
satisfy the assumption, all regressions are run using robust standard errors and 
outcome variables that do not satisfy the assumption of normality are 
transformed into logs. Because this is a non-experimental design, the estimates I 
find do not mean that titling has a particular effect measured by the regression 
coefficient. It rather provides a tentative indication as to whether the variables 
may be related (or not as the case may be). Although this is the most appropriate 
estimation method, I cannot control for unobservable factors that may be 
driving observed variation in the outcome. While the two neighbourhoods are 
quite similar, they are not the same and so may be affected by different factors. 
Unobserved factors can only be controlled for in the presence of baseline data 
which was not available for this study.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 2 below presents the characteristics of the respondents in Matero and 
George and compares their mean differences. 
 
There are no demographic differences in terms of age, marital status, father’s 
education, mother’s education and household size. Respondents in the Matero 
sample are likely to be more educated with an average of 9 years, than George 
residents, who have an average of 7 years (t(484) = -4.80, p=0.00). However, it 
also means that the typical respondent in both neighbourhoods is likely to be a 
school dropout. The proportion of male heads of household in the Matero 
sample is lower (0.52) compared to that of George (0.64) (t(495) = 2.80, 
p=0.00). This difference may be attributed to the original demographics in 
George where, at the time of settling, only men settled there as unmarried 
women were prohibited to live in cities at the time. Matero had a section called 
the married quarters where married workers were allowed to live with their 
families. Many of the families have remained in their original plots. In fact, 
respondents in Matero have a slightly lower length of housing tenure compared 
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to George. On average, my respondents in Matero have lived there for 28 years 
compared with 31 years for George respondents (t(479) = 2.74, p=0.00). 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of beneficiaries of titling in Matero versus 
George residents 
 
Variable 
Matero 
n=262 
George 
n=236 T 
Property value 17.99 17.17 -8.12*** 
Credit access 0.03 0.01 -1.11 
Employment status 0.71 0.67 -0.84 
Employed female 0.14 0.07 -2.52** 
Home-based investments 0.58 0.65 1.79* 
Rooms 5.20 5.70 2.06** 
Rent  0.52 0.63 2.29** 
Home-based business 0.30 0.31 0.17 
Log of Income per capita 11.67 11.29 -4.21*** 
Household consumer durables 1.61 1.22 -5.48*** 
Membership in voluntary associations 1.30 1.36 0.81 
Political awareness 0.36 0.29 -3.85*** 
Volunteerism 0.45 0.50 0.83 
Neighbourhood attachment 10.52 10.88 1.12 
Age 55 54 -0.89 
Male 0.52 0.64 2.80*** 
Education 9 7 -4.80*** 
Marital status 0.52 0.56 0.92 
Household size 6.34 6.19 -0.65 
Father’s education 6.95 6.76 -0.31 
Mother’s education 4.67 3.95 -1.27 
Duration 27.48 30.58 2.75*** 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
As regards the outcome variables, respondents in Matero report higher logged 
property values (17.99) compared to those from George (17.17). In currency 
terms, Matero residents report that the average value of their houses is K75.2 
million (US$14,500) while those in George report an average of K42.8 million 
(US$8,200). This difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level with 
t(275) = -8.12, p=0.00. Despite their geographical proximity, houses in Matero 
have a higher property value. 
 
In terms of credit access, there is an insignificant minority of respondents in 
both neighbourhoods who have used their house as collateral to obtain a loan. 
Of the Matero sample, 3 percent are able to obtain loans compared with 1 
10 
 
percent for respondents from George. This difference is not statistically 
significant with t(496) = -1.11, p=0.27. 
 
Matero respondents are not different from George residents in terms of labour 
market participation. Matero respondents have a higher proportion of employed 
household heads at 71 percent while George respondents had 67 percent. The 
difference is however not statistically significant (t(376) = 0.84, p=0.40). 
Similarly, there are no significant differences in the proportion of female heads 
of household that are employed. Matero respondents have a score of 0.66 
percent and George 0.65 percent with t(148) = 0.06, p=0.95. 
 
With respect to engagement in home-based investments, Matero respondents 
have a lower proportion compared to those in George. Matero respondents have 
a score of 0.58 compared with 0.65 for George residents. The difference is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level t(491) = 1.79, p=0.07. This means 
that Matero respondents are less likely to run businesses compared to George 
respondents. 
 
Essentially, fewer households in the Matero sample rent out part of their house 
than those in George. The proportion is 0.52 for Matero compared with 0.63 for 
George. The difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (t(444) = 
2.29, p=0.02). 
 
There are no differences in terms of non-rent-based business investments with 
Matero respondents scoring 0.30 and George respondents 0.31, t(274) = 0.17, 
p=0.86. 
 
Besides, Matero respondents report a higher household per capita income than 
those in George. The logged per capita income score of Matero respondents is 
11.67 compared with 11.30 for George respondents with t(331) = -4.21, p=0.00. 
As expected, the variable for household income has many missing observations 
-- a challenge in many surveys. Often, measures that are less likely to have 
missing observations, such as expenditure data and durable items, are used as a 
proxy. Durable items are also used as a crude measure of wealth and this 
approach is taken in this analysis. 
 
In this regard, Matero respondents have more durable household items than 
George respondents. Matero households score 1.61 on the logged household 
durables scale while those in George score 1.22 with t(488) = -5.74, p=0.00. In 
real figures, Matero respondents have on average 6 household items while those 
in George have 4. 
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With regard to measures of citizen behaviour, Matero respondents report higher 
political awareness but the same number of membership in voluntary 
associations, frequency of volunteerism and neighbourly attachment. Matero 
respondents score 0.36 out of 1 on the political awareness scale while George 
respondents scored 0.29. The difference is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level (t(484) = -3.85, p=0.00). Matero respondents belong to an average 
of 1.30 voluntary associations against 1.35 for George, (t(475) = 0.81, p=0.42), 
0.45 out of 3 on frequency of volunteerism against 0.50, (t(493) = 0.83, p=0.41), 
and 10.52 out of 18 on the neighbourly attachment scale against 10.89 for 
George (t(494) = 1.13, p=0.26). Attachment is strong in both neighbourhoods; a 
score of about 60 percent on the attachment scale for both neighbourhoods. 
 
Overall, the results show initial indication of support for the hypotheses that 
leasehold titling increases property values, female employment, household 
income per capita, household consumer durables, and political awareness. 
Counter-intuitively, there is initial support for the hypothesis that leasehold 
titling leads to fewer home-based investments in general and rent-based 
investments in particular. Nevertheless, based on T-tests, the strength of these 
relationships cannot be ascertained. Additionally, the magnitude of association 
in these relationships cannot be determined unless a natural experiment was 
being analysed. Correlation and regression analysis are employed to explore 
these hypotheses and to generate a sense of the likely magnitude of the 
relationships and relationships of association.    
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Table 3: Pearson’s pairwise correlations between each outcome variable and leasehold title 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Leasehold title 1            
2 Property value 0.44*** 1           
3 Credit access 0.05 0.04 1          
4 Employment status of  
   Head 
0.04 0.01 0.06 1         
5 Employed female head -0.01 -0.04 0.05 1.00 1        
6 Investments  -0.08* 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.00 1       
7 Income per capita 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.02 1      
8 Log consumer durables 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.11*** 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.38*** 1     
9 Memberships -0.04 0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.18*** 1    
10 Political Awareness 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.06 0.17*** 0.01 -0.02 0.25*** 0.51*** 0.23*** 1   
11 Volunteer frequency -0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.14*** -0.02 0.11*** -0.06 0.13*** 0.29*** 0.21*** 1  
12 Neighbourhood       
     Attachment 
-0.05 -0.08 0.01 -0.13*** 0.00 0.05 -0.07 -0.13*** 0.04 -0.10** 0.06 1 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 3 reports the correlations between leasehold title (i.e living in Matero) and 
each of the dependent variables. The correlation coefficient is a measure of the 
strength and direction of the relationship. The correlations reveal that leasehold 
titling is positively correlated with property value (r=0.45 (p=0.00)), household 
per capita income (r=0.23 (p=0.00)) and household consumer durables (r=0.25 
(p=0.00)) and political awareness (r=0.17 (p=0.00)). This means that a change in 
leasehold titling from 0 to 1 is accompanied by an increase in the above-
mentioned outcome variables. Leasehold titling is negatively correlated with 
home-based business investments in general (r=0.08 (p=07)). This is a very 
weak relationship which means that the same change in leasehold titling is 
accompanied by a reduction in home-based business investments. There is no 
correlation between leasehold titling and access to credit, employment status, 
employment status of female heads of household, membership in voluntary 
associations, frequency of volunteering, and neighbourly attachment. This 
means that the same change is accompanied by no change in these outcome 
variables. 
 
The correlation analysis informs us that the strengths of the relationships are 
generally weak for the variables that are correlated with leasehold titling. 
Correlation analysis however does not provide us with an indication of the 
magnitude of the change in the outcome variables that can be associated with a 
leasehold title. I employ regression analyses to provide such estimations and 
only the hypotheses found to be correlated with leasehold titling are tested. 
 
Table 4 below reports the OLS regression of property value against leasehold 
titling and other covariates and shows that leasehold title is associated with 
property values 70 to 80 percent higher. The bivariate regression in Model A 
reports property values 82 percent (β=0.82) higher than those for occupancy 
title. When demographic characteristics are included in model B, the regression 
coefficient reduces to 74 percent (β=0.74). The explained variation increases to 
23 percent (R2=0.23). When I include employment status, secondary 
employment and per capita income variables, the coefficient shows property 
values higher by 80 percent (β=0.80). The explained variation rises to 34 percent 
(R2=0.34) in the final model. In all the models, the regression coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level indicating that this is not a chance 
occurrence. The finding remains robust with various controls; the leasehold 
titling variable does not lose significance when demographic and other variables 
are included in the models.  
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Table 4: OLS regression of property value against titling and other 
covariates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables Model A Model B Model C 
Leasehold 0.82*** 0.74*** 0.80*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) 
Age of household head  0.00 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Male  -0.13 -0.06 
  (0.13) (0.13) 
Education  0.05*** 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
Household size  0.02 0.04 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment status   -0.23* 
   (0.12) 
Employed members   0.34*** 
   (0.13) 
Per capita income   0.32*** 
   (0.08) 
Married  0.06  
  (0.12)  
Constant 17.18*** 16.51*** 12.70*** 
 (0.09) (0.33) (1.12) 
R-squared 0.19 0.23 0.34 
Observations 277 254 151 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
By interpretation, the results merely show that there is a significant difference in 
property values between Matero and George households. However, this analysis 
cannot reveal with certainty that this difference is attributed to titling. The 
evidence is at least exploratory and at best indicative of titling being responsible 
for higher property values. Pre-titling data on property values in both 
neighbourhoods would be useful in strengthening the analysis. The survey did 
not include variables such as ease of accessibility of water services, tarred roads 
and the existence of a planned grid, all of which are factors that favour Matero 
over George.  
 
Table 5 below reports the regression of home-based investments against 
leasehold titling and demonstrates that titled households are associated with a 
lower probability of running home-based investments but this effect disappears 
when the variable number of rooms is introduced into the equation. This 
suggests that the observed effect of titling is actually explained by the number of 
rooms and not property title. In Model A, respondents from titled households are 
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found to have lower odds relative to George respondents by 0.33. In Model B, 
the odds further reduce to 0.41 when demographic variables are included. The 
explained variation rises to 1 percent. In the final model, the title variable ceases 
to be statistically significant once the number of rooms variable is included in 
the equation. The explained variation rises to 17 percent. Essentially, the 
evidence suggests that all the variation is explained by the number of rooms a 
household has from which it can be inferred that almost all home-based 
investments are rental investments.  
 
 
Table 5: Logistic regression of home-based investments against titling 
and other covariates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables Model A Model B Model C 
Leasehold -0.33* -0.41** -0.01 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.30) 
Age of head  -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Education  0.02 -0.05 
  (0.03) (0.04) 
Married  -0.18 -0.29 
  (0.21) (0.28) 
Household size  0.04 -0.08 
  (0.04) (0.05) 
Log of household durables   -0.02 
   (0.23) 
Employed   0.15 
   (0.31) 
Rooms   0.48*** 
   (0.08) 
Constant 0.64*** 0.87 -0.68 
 (0.14) (0.56) (0.86) 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.17 
Observations 493 445 298 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
As a robustness check, a logistic regression analysis was employed with only 
rent-based investments as the dependent variable. The effect of leasehold titling 
disappears and the effect of rooms on rent investments increases from an odds 
ratio of 0.49 to 0.58. The explained variation also increases significantly to 21 
percent (R2=0.21). The analysis reveals that whilst property rights are trivial,  
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the number of rooms are important in households running businesses, the 
predominant business being renting out a room.  
Table 6: OLS regression of household income per capita against titling 
and other covariates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables Model A Model B Model C 
Leasehold 0.38*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Age of head  -0.01** -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Male  0.02 0.05 
  (0.10) (0.11) 
Education  0.06*** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Married  0.22** 0.27** 
  (0.10) (0.12) 
Household size  -0.11*** -0.12*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Rooms   0.05*** 
   (0.02) 
Employed   -0.01 
   (0.11) 
Employed members   0.11 
   (0.12) 
Constant 11.30*** 11.82*** 11.44*** 
 (0.07) (0.22) (0.28) 
R-squared 0.05 0.28 0.34 
Observations 333 309 237 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Thus far, the evidence indicates that there is no effect of leasehold rights on the 
mechanisms through which it increases household per capita income; leasehold 
titling has no effect on access to credit, employment status, employment status 
of women, or on home-based investments. Surprisingly, the evidence indicates 
that a leasehold title is positively associated with household per capita income. 
Table 6 above reports that household incomes are between 28 and 38 percent 
higher among Matero respondents compared to George respondents. The 
bivariate regression in Model A reveals that leasehold titling is associated with a 
coefficient of β=0.38. This means that per capita income among Matero 
respondents is 38 percent higher relative to those in George. The explained 
variation is 5 percent (R2=0.05). When I add the demographic variables, 
particularly education, to the regression equation, the coefficient reduces to 
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β=0.28 (28 percent higher). The explained variation increases to 28 percent 
which is a good model fit. In the final model, I find that respondents in Matero 
have per capita incomes 32 percent higher (β=0.32). The model fit is good with 
R2=0.34. 
 
There are many reasons why titled respondents may have higher income. It 
could be that one or more of the mechanisms are actually working but the data 
and methods used cannot pick it up. This result can also be attributed to some 
unobserved factors not controlled for – the two main reasons being pensions and 
remittances. Although both neighbourhoods have pensioners, it is possible that 
Matero has more given that its’ residents had to be in formal employment to 
access a house. Matero residents may also be benefitting from higher 
remittances from children. Furthermore, it is also possible that, after obtaining 
ownership, Matero respondents have become more successful at lobbying for 
extended family support (Schlyter, 2004: 7) which results in higher income. 
However, these dynamics can only be speculated.  
 
Returning the focus to the data, despite the fact that Matero respondents have 
fewer odds of engaging in home-based investments, average incomes from rent 
is higher among Matero respondents. Although the difference is not statistically 
significant, Matero respondents report earning an average of K224,864 
compared with K209,098 in George. Employment status is also higher in Matero 
(71 percent of household heads) compared to George (67 percent). Despite the 
fact that these differences are not statistically significant, incomes from these 
small differences can become significant. Another problem could be that the 
measure is not functioning well. This last point is addressed in the regression of 
household durables against leasehold titling. These measures are correlated (r = 
0.38, p=0.00). 
 
As in the regression analyses above, the result is merely an indication of the 
possibility that titling or property rights may be associated with higher income. 
 
The results reported in table 7 below reveal that, in line with having more 
household per capita income, households with a leasehold title have more wealth 
as measured by household durables. The Models report that Matero respondents 
have between 28 and 40 percent more consumer durables. In Model A, titling is 
associated with 39 percent (β=0.39) more wealth relative to occupancy licenses 
(R2=0.06). Controlling for demographic variables, leasehold titling is associated 
with 28 percent (β=0.28) more consumer durables and the model explains 30 
percent of the variation (R2=0.30) which is a good model fit. Controlling for 
number of rooms and employment status, the regression coefficient shows titling 
to be associated with 33 percent more durables with the model explaining 37 
percent of the variation (R2=0.37), an even better measure of good fit. The 
18 
 
coefficients are very similar to those for the regression of logged household 
income per capita which shows that the measures are interchangeable with the 
household durables variable having more observations and the models 
explaining more variation. 
 
 
Table 7: OLS regression of consumer durables against titling and other 
covariates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables Model A Model B Model C 
Leasehold 0.39*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age of head  -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Male  0.01 0.01 
  (0.07) (0.08) 
Education  0.08*** 0.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Married  0.01 0.01 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
Employed members   0.20*** 
   (0.07) 
Rooms   0.06*** 
   (0.01) 
Constant 1.22*** 1.03*** 0.67*** 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.17) 
R-squared 0.06 0.30 0.37 
Observations 438 407 389 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Additionally, I test the hypothesis that property rights are associated with more 
political awareness relative to occupancy tenure. Table 8 reports the regression 
of leasehold titling against political awareness and reveals that property rights 
are associated with more political awareness. The bivariate model reports a 
regression coefficient of β=0.07. On the scale, this means a level of political 
awareness 7 percent higher. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level and the explained variation is 3 percent which is not a good model 
fit. Controlling for demographic characteristics, including education which is 
higher among Matero respondents and likely to influence the result, the 
coefficient reduces to β=0.03 or 3 percent with a good model fit (R2=0.29). The 
significance level reduces to 10 percent meaning that much of the effect comes 
from the level of education but that titling has its own independent effect. In the 
final model, in which I include belonging to a political party, the regression 
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coefficient remains at β=0.03 significant at the 10 percent level. The model fit is 
good with R2=0.30. 
 
 
Table 8: OLS regression of political awareness against titling and other 
covariates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables Model A Model B Model C 
Leasehold 0.07*** 0.03* 0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age of head  -0.00  
  (0.00)  
Male  0.00 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Education  0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Household size  0.01* 0.01** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Married  0.02  
  (0.02)  
Member in political party    0.01 
   (0.03) 
Constant 0.29*** 0.13*** 0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) 
R-squared 0.03 0.29 0.30 
Observations 486 439 460 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Residents of Matero obtained housing through a politicised process. Matero and 
George have historically had a reputation for being highly political 
neighbourhoods (Rakodi and Schlyter, 1981). In 1975, George was one of the 
areas that was meant to be demolished. In order to gain political support from 
the area however, President Kaunda decided to upgrade it. Similarly in Matero, 
many believe that the then President Frederick J.T. Chiluba, fearing to lose the 
1996 election to then former president Kenneth Kaunda, decided to offer the 
houses to sitting tenants in order to win their support. It can be inferred that this 
was the reason why a presidential directive was issued to sell the houses even 
though the National Housing Policy did not provide for privatisation of public 
housing. 
 
With this background, the regression models suggest that titling is associated 
with political awareness especially in contexts where the process was politically 
motivated. 
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5. Discussion 
 
In this paper I set out to examine the economic and non-economic effects of 
property rights by evaluating the effects of leasehold titling in Matero using 
occupancy licenses in George as a comparison. I set out to test eleven 
hypotheses; leasehold titling has an effect on property value, access to credit, 
employment status of household heads, employment status of female household 
heads, home-based investments, household per capita income, household 
consumer durables, membership in voluntary associations, frequency of 
volunteering, political awareness and neighbourhood attachment. The results are 
exploratory and at best symptomatic due to problems in the process of data 
collection. A lack of existing survey data on the subject in these neighbourhoods 
meant that I had to collect and analyse survey data to test these hypotheses. The 
data was meant to be collected by first drawing a random sample in Matero and 
then matching that sample with a sample from George on the basis of a 
similarity of a wide set of characteristics. The matching was not possible 
because a sampling frame could not be accessed. An alternative decision was 
made to draw a random sample in George using interval sampling. This meant 
that the result would be less robust and by no means satisfy the assumptions for 
a causal argument to be made. 
 
Given this background, I find that leasehold titling is associated with higher 
property values. My estimate is that property values rise to about 80 percent 
more than that of households on occupancy tenure. This is a combined value of 
the land and house. Elsewhere, titling has been found to substantially increase 
property values. My own estimate is on the higher end comparable to that of 
Dowall and Leaf’s in their work with land brokers in Jakarta, Indonesia, who 
found an increase of 73 percent (Dowall and Leaf, 1991), and Alston, Libecap 
and Schneider who reported a 100 percent increase in Brazil (Alstonet al., 
1996). Other studies reporting a high increase include Jimenez in Davao, 
Philippines who found a 58 percent increase in value (Jimenez, 1984) and 
Dowall who finds an increase of 45 percent in Indonesia (Dowall and Leaf, 
1991). Most studies however estimate an increase of around 25 percent in 
Ecuador (Lanjouw and Levy, 2002), in Peru (Cantuarias and Delgado, 2004) in 
Indonesia (Dowall, 1998) and in Manila in the Philippines (Friedman et al., 
1988). My own estimates include post-titling housing improvements and may 
also be slightly higher because of respondents who reported the value comparing 
that of their neighbours instead of valuation by the land surveyor. More broadly, 
however, land and housing prices have appreciated in Lusaka in particular and 
Zambia in general. Further research would benefit from using actual price 
valuations from land surveying departments to estimate property values. 
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Despite high increases in property values, my evidence tentatively indicates that 
there is no association between leasehold titling and access to credit. Out of my 
entire sample, 98 percent did not use their house as collateral to access credit. I 
find no systematic scholarly studies investigating the effect of titling on access 
to credit in urban areas of Lusaka. A study on rural Zambia finds that small-
scale land-holders are wary of using their land as collateral even when they can 
access credit (Home and Lim, 2004). Elsewhere, the findings are ambiguous 
with a leaning towards no effect of titling on credit access (Field and Torero, 
2006; Boudreaux, 2008; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010; Lemanski, 2011). 
Future research should focus on the role of culture in influencing credit. 
 
Similarly, my evidence does not support the hypothesis that leasehold titling has 
a positive effect on labour market participation. Their probabilities of 
employment are the same. Correspondingly, the assumption that leasehold 
titling has a positive effect on employment status of female heads of households 
was not supported. Given the conditions of high unemployment, widespread 
poverty and high income inequality in the country, titling is unlikely to lead to 
increased employment if the economy in general cannot support a larger labour 
force. Elsewhere, studies find positive effects of titling on household labour 
participation and hours allocated to activities outside the home mainly through 
the mechanism of tenure security (Field, 2005; Field and Torero, 2006; Field, 
2007)  while others find no significant effects (Rose, 2006; Galiani and 
Schargrodsky, 2010). In Senegal the impact of titling on the economy of 
families is “limited and barely measurable” which means that titling barely has 
an effect on labour market outcomes (Payne et al., 2009). Further research is 
required as to what the optimal economic conditions are for titling to have a 
positive effect on labour market participation either through increases in home 
businesses or increases in tenure security. 
 
Congruently, I do not find evidence in support of the assumption that leasehold 
titling increases home-based investments. Work from scholars on perceived 
tenure security can help explain this result. It has been shown that psychological 
pathways of thinking and feeling influence how dwellers make decisions about 
the probability of eviction and determines their level of fear of eviction (Reerink 
and Van Gelder, 2010; Van Gelder, 2013). It is clear that respondents in George 
feel that even if they engage in activities that go contrary to their terms of 
occupancy, they will not be evicted. They are then able to engage in businesses 
from that perspective. Further, enforcement of the terms of occupancy by the 
Lusaka City Council seems absent. It would cost the Lusaka City Council more, 
both economically and politically, in terms of unrest if they enforced many of 
the terms of occupancy. More research on this mechanism is required, 
particularly ways through which new title holders finance their home-businesses 
using the title when they cannot access credit. 
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Notwithstanding, I find uncertain evidence that leasehold titling increases 
household per capita income. My evidence shows that the mechanisms by which 
this is likely to occur do not work. Due to the limitation of having no baseline in 
my data, there is a likelihood that the mechanisms are working but the evidence 
cannot pick up the effects. It is likely that higher property values attract higher 
income from rent. Following titling, Schlyter (2004: 7) documented the practice 
of raising finances for houses in Matero through the extended family in order to 
make extensions. Due to a still strong extended family system, houses are 
viewed as family homes despite being in the name of one person or several 
siblings. Such contributions can be exchanged for domicile rights. It is possible 
that this is a factor contributing to higher household income. In other studies, the 
evidence focuses on higher income generated through the mechanism of labour 
market participation and hours allocated to activities outside the home (Field, 
2005; Field and Torero, 2006; Rose, 2006; Field, 2007; Galiani and 
Schargrodsky, 2010). Other mechanisms need to be explored. Most research was 
targeted at access to credit but this does not generally work. Title holders 
opening businesses is such a mechanism that requires further testing. My study 
therefore suggests that by virtue of having a title or tenure security, the poor in 
Lusaka can open small home-based businesses and obtain an income. 
 
Moreover, my findings indicate indeterminately that leasehold titling increases 
wealth as crudely measured by household consumer durables. This contradicts 
the findings of Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010: 716) who found no significant 
relationship between property rights and durable asset consumption. The main 
difference is that my study had a longer list of durable items as compared to that 
of Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010: 716) who had only included a refrigerator 
with freezer, refrigerator without freezer, washing machine, television and 
cellular phone. Further, Galiani and Schargrodsky’s (2010:716) models use a 
dummy variable for possession of each asset relative to the lack of possession of 
that asset as a dependent variable while my study uses an index of a more 
exhaustive list. 
 
The hypothesis that leasehold titling is associated with more memberships in 
voluntary associations is not supported. Likewise, I do not find evidence that 
leasehold titling increases the frequency of volunteerism. Volunteerism is 
generally not a widely practiced activity in Zambian communities, particularly 
among the poor who spend most of their time trying to fulfil their most basic 
needs. One other study examining this hypothesis among 17 Latin American 
countries finds no effect of titling on membership in voluntary associations 
(Pecha and Ruprah, 2010). 
 
Nonetheless, the findings provide indefinite support for the hypothesis that 
leasehold titling increases political awareness. In contrast, there is no evidence 
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supporting this hypothesis in Latin American countries (Pecha and Ruprah, 
2010). 
 
Furthermore, leasehold titling is not related to neighbourhood attachment. 
However, social attachment is strong in both neighbourhoods. This could be 
attributed to the fact that social relationships in the two neighbourhoods have 
been stable for a long time such that neighbours know, trust and understand one 
another well. In both neighbourhoods, respondents have lived an average of 
about 30 years during which they have built strong social networks. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study demonstrates that effects of titling in Southern Africa extend beyond 
economic effects. These have thus far been understudied in the literature. 
Scholars need to go beyond examining economic effects and focus on both 
human and social capital effects. Since titling had no effect on important 
economic measures, it is likely that poverty in Matero is driven so strongly by 
factors such as overall unemployment levels in Zambia that property rights 
make little difference to urban poverty. More evaluations of this nature need to 
be carried out in Southern Africa and Africa as a whole to contribute to an 
understanding of how property rights may help improve conditions of poverty in 
urban areas.  
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